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 Abstract - In this paper, we present a framework for analysis of self 
organized distributed coalition formation process for spectrum 
sharing in interference channel for large scale ad hoc networks. 
In this approach we use concept of coalition clusters within the 
network where mutual interdependency between different clusters is 
characterized by the concept of spatial network correlation. Then by 
using stochastic models of the process we give up some details 
characteristic for coalition game theory in order to be able to include 
some additional parameters for network scaling. Applications of this 
model are: a) Estimation of average time τ  to reach grand coalition 
and its variance 2τσ  through closed form equations. These 
parameters are important in designing the process in dynamic 
environment. b) Dimensioning the coalition cluster within the 
network c) Modelling the network spatial correlation characterizing 
mutual visibility of the interfering links. d) Modelling of the effect 
of the new link activation/inactivation on the coalition forming 
process. e) Modelling the effect of link mobility on the coalition 
forming process.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation as a new networking paradigm has been used to 
improve the performance of the physical layer [1, 2] up to the 
networking layers [3]. Coalitional games are proved to be a 
very powerful tool for designing fair, robust, practical, and 
efficient cooperation strategies in communication networks.  
Most of the current research in this field is restricted to 
applying standard coalitional game models and techniques to 
study very limited aspects of cooperation in networks. This is 
mainly due to lack of the literature that tackles coalitional 
games. In fact, most pioneering game theoretical references, 
such as [4, 5], focus on noncooperative games, touching 
slightly on coalitional games within a few chapters. 
A coalitional game is formally defined by the pair (N, v), 
where N is the set of players and v is the coalition value. The 
most common form of a coalitional game is the characteristic 
form, whereby the value of a coalition S depends solely on 
the members of that coalition, with no dependence on how 
the players in N \ S are structured. The characteristic form 
was introduced, along with a category of coalitional games 
known as games with transferable utility (TU), by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern [6].  
In a coalitional game with nontransferable utility (NTU), the 
payoff that each player in a coalition S receives is dependent 
on the joint actions that the players of coalition S select. The 
action space depends on the underlying noncooperative game 
[7]. The value of a coalition S in an NTU game, v(S), is no 
longer a function over the real line, but a set of payoff 
vectors, where each element of a vector represents a payoff 
that player i can obtain within coalition S given a certain 
strategy selected by i while being a member of S. Given this 
definition, a TU game can be seen as a particular case of the 
NTU framework [4]. 
The class of canonical coalitional games, is the most popular 
category of games in coalitional game theory.  
One application of the canonical games for the study of rate 
allocation in multiple access channels (MAC), within 
communication networks is presented in [1, 8, 9]. The models 
tackle the problem of how to fairly allocate the transmission 
rates between a number of users accessing a wireless 
Gaussian MAC channel. In this model, the users are 
bargaining for obtaining a fair allocation of the total 
transmission rate available. Every user or group of users 
(coalition) that does not obtain a fair allocation of the rate can 
threaten to act on its own, which can reduce the rate available 
for the remaining users. The game is modelled as a 
coalitional game defined by (N, v) where N is the set of 
players, i.e., the wireless network users that need to access 
the channel, and v is the maximum sum-rate that a coalition S 
can achieve. 
[10] presents two main rules for forming or breaking 
coalitions, referred to as merge and split . The basic idea 
behind the rules is that, given a set of players N, any 
collection of disjoint coalitions ( S1 ,.., S l ) can agree to merge 
into a single coalition G, if this new coalition G is preferred 
by the players over the previous state depending on the 
selected comparison order. Similarly, a coalition S splits into 
smaller coalitions if the resulting collection ( S1 ,.., S l ) is 
preferred by the players over S . 
In canonical and coalition formation games, the utility or the 
value of a coalition does not depend on how the players are 
interconnected within the coalition. However, it has been 
shown that, in certain scenarios, the underlying 
communication structure between the players in a coalitional 
game can have a major impact on the utility and other 
characteristics of the game [11].  
In this paper we present a contribution to model coalition 
games for spectrum sharing in interference channel for 
applications in large scale wireless ad hoc networks. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows, 
System model and coalition formation protocol are presented 
in Section II. The proposed model for coalition formulation 
problem is presented in Section III. Optimization of the 
cluster size is presented in Sections IV and corresponding 
numerical results are presented in Section V. And finally 
paper is concluded in Section VI. 
II. THE SYSTEM MODEL: PRELIMINARIES 
The network consists of a number of links whose transmitters 
and receivers are randomly located within a certain area A. In 
the case when all links transmit simultaneously, the signal 
received by a reference receiver r is given as  
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ri
irirrrr nxhxhy ++= ∑
≠
 (1) 
where the second term in right hand side of (1) is interference 
received from the other transmitters. SINR and its equivalent 
maximum transmission rate are calculated as, 
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where iP  is the transmitted power from transmitter of link i 
, irg the channel gain between the transmitter of link i and 
receiver of link r and 0N  is the receiver background noise 
power. In this scenario a given transmitter can spread its 
signal over entire available bandwidth or share the bandwidth 
with other users in the network in certain proportion. For the 
convenience of the presentation let us assume at the 
beginning that the mutual channel gains are known. This 
assumption has significant impact on the coalition forming 
process and for this reason will be reconsidered later. 
The above assumption for communication between the users i 
and j during the process of coalition negotiation some 
signalling capacity cij RR =  is required. In the literature the 
signalling network is referred to as underlying network [12] 
and the system performance depends significantly on its 
capacity. In general more sophisticated algorithms, leading 
faster to optimum operation of the network, would also 
require more information to be exchanged between the users 
which consequently require more signalling capacity.  
If the interfering level from other users is too high, the 
reference user r may consider proposing the coalition ( )jrS ,  
to a given user j which consists of sharing the spectra in 
certain proportion.  
Again, for simplicity, let us assume that the spectra will be 
shared evenly (one half for each).  The extension to the case 
of so called fair partitioning of the value of the game where 
the pay off to the users is proportional to their contribution to 
the value of the game (Shapley value) [4] is straightforward. 
Under these conditions we have  
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where cS RR = and 
cS is the complementary set of users not 
belonging to coalition S.  The signal to interference to noise 
ratio is now improved because the two users in the coalition 
do not transmit simultaneously, but the user can use only a 
half of the available spectra (or time slots). The condition for 
the coalition formation is that the both users are benefiting 
from such coalition which can be formally expressed as  
.rSr RR ≥∈  (6) 
  This simple concept will be elaborated later in more details.  
A. Distributed Stochastic Interference Channel Model 
In this section, we generalize the previous concept in order to 
be used in large scale networks. Like in any other 
generalization, we will have to give up some details in the 
system modelling, characteristic for coalition game theory, in 
order to be able to include some additional system parameters 
relevant to network scaling. We will assume that every user 
in the network identifies N the strongest interferers (seen by 
its receiver) and initiate process to establish coalition with 
these links in order to reduce the mutual interference. The 
deviation from this assumption to the case where the user is 
aware only of the aggregate interference would be to initiate 
the coalition forming process with randomly chosen 
interferer.  
In fully correlated network (FCN), the same set of interfering 
signals is observed by all receivers. The strength of the 
interfering signals observed with different receivers is 
uncorrelated. This models the case where the cluster size N 
equals the overall number of terminals in the network M. 
In partially correlated network (PCN), with correlation 
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the transmitter of specific user i, whose receiver identifies N 
interfering links, is not observed by a receivers from the set 
of the interfering links. The strength of the interfering signals 
observed with different receivers is again uncorrelated. In a 
real network, in every particular time instance, parameter a 
might be different for each link but in average the statistical 
channel model assumes that parameter a is the same for each 
link. In a fully connected one hop network with M terminals 
and cluster size N with M>N, probability distribution 
function ( )ap  can be expressed as  
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In (8), p represents the probability that for the two links i and 
j, the receiver of link i observes the interference from 
transmitter of link j but the receiver of link j does not see the 
interference from transmitter of link i.   
B. Coalition Formation Protocol (CFP) 
Once getting the right to initiate coalition formation process, 
and known channel coefficients, the user i proposes the 
coalition formation to the link j with the interfering level  
a) higher than the level of its useful signal. 
b) maximum interfering level. 
c) interfering level with no more than δ positions 
below its own received signal level on the ordered list of the 
received signals. 
d) to the arbitrary chosen link (when only the aggregate 
level of interference is known) . 
 The interfering link j will accept the coalition if the 
interfering level from the user i is 
e) higher than the level of its useful signal. 
f) its maximum interfering level. 
g) no more than δ positions bellow the level of the 
received signal level on the ordered list of received signals. 
h) The interfering link j accepts the coalition 
conditionally, initiates the channel sharing mode, checks the 
effects of the coalition forming and confirm or reject the 
coalition based on the experienced value obtained by the 
coalition.  
III. CFP MODELLING 
The graph presentation of the CFP is shown in Fig.1. Assume 
there are M available links and the process starts with a group 
of N randomly selected users ( )NG  in singleton status where 
MN << .  A given link i creates an ordered list of interferers 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }NilililjiliL ,,...,2,,1,, ==  including its own 
signal by allocating the lowest index j=1 to the weakest 
signal level. Node 1, on graph in Fig.1a, represents the case 
when the useful signal level is the lowest on the list i.e. 
( ) ( )1,ilil = . In the statistical interference channel model, this 
will happen with probability ( )1 1/p p N N= = . Under the 
condition represented by node 1 and option a) in Section II.C 
the link will propose the coalition formation to the link k with 
the interfering level ( )kil ,  higher than the level of its useful 
signal that would happen with probability one for N >1 since 
all other links have higher level ( ) ( ) ( ) .for;,1, kkililil ∀≤=   
Link k will have its own list ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }NklklkljklkL ,,...,2,,1,, ==  
and its own level ( ) ( )nklkl ,=  can be with same probability 
N
1
 anywhere on the list ( )kL . The level of the link i, 
proposing the coalition, is also uniformly distributed on the 
list ( )kL . Extension to the case when these probabilities are 
arbitrary distribution functions is straightforward. Link k will 
accept the coalition if the level of the link proposing the 
coalition is higher than its own level on the list ( )kL . This 
will occur with probability  
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In partially correlated network (PCN), with correlation 
factor ( )1 /a Nρ = − , the transmitter of the specific link i, 
whose receiver identifies N interfering links, is not seen by a 
receivers from the set of the interfering links. In this case (11) 
should be modified as 
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In right hand side of (12), a unobservable interferers are 
excluded from the list ( )kL  and consequently, 
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By averaging (13) over a using (9), we have 
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After some manipulations  (14) is simplified as 
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When the coalition request is accepted, the process in Fig. 1b 
will move to the level ( )1−NG  which represents the same 
cluster of links where two links have created coalition that 
will be represented by coalition head which will be 
negotiating the further coalition process on behalf of the 
coalition. Effectively from that point on there will be N-1 
negotiators. 
Depending on the capacity of the underlying network, that 
determines the amount of information that can be distributed 
about the coalition,  the level of interference caused by the 
coalition will be represented either by the level of the 
coalition head or the sum of the levels of the coalition 
members. If the proposal for coalition is not accepted, which 
occurs with probability ( ) ( )NpNp cc −= 1' , the process will 
remain on level ( )NG and the proposals for coalition will be 
initiated from the same level. In this case, coalition cluster is 
updated by substituting the link that has rejected the coalition 
request with a new one from M-N remained links. 
In the node 1 of the graph in Fig. 1, the level of the user i on 
list ( )iL  will not be the lowest with probability 
( ) ( )NppNp −=−= 11 1' and the process will move to node 
2, which represents the hypothesis that this level is the second 
on the list given that it is not the lowest. In general, node k 
represents the probability that the level of the useful signal is 
the k-th on the list given that it is not lower that k. Under 
these assumptions, the transition probabilities are represented 
in the graph. 
Summing up all possible ways to go from ( )NG  back to 
( )NG  we have the transition probability ( )NNp , and to 
move to ( )1−NG  the transition probability ( )1, −NNp as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kNp
N
iNpkNpkNpNNp c
N
k
k
i
c
N
k
−=−−−= ∑∏∑
−
=
−
=
−
=
'
1
0
1
0
''
1
0
1
,
 
(16) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )NNpiNpkNpkNpNNp k
i
c
N
k
,11,
1
0
'
1
0
−=−−−=− ∏∑
−
=
−
=
 
(17) 
and the graph from Fig. 1a can be replaced by an equivalent 
graph from Fig. 1b, where z represents a fixed time T, in z 
transform, needed for initiation and decision on coalition 
forming.  
By substituting (11) in (16) and (17), transient probabilities 
for a FCN is simply derived as 
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From (18) we can see ( )NNp FCN ,  is bounded as 
( ) ).1(1,2/1)1( =≤<>> NforNNpNfor FCN . (20) 
And for a PCN which is a more general model, transient 
probabilities are computed as follows, 
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From (21), upper and lower bounds of ( )NNp PCN ,  are as 
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In (23) upper bound holds for N=1 and lower bound holds for 
N=2. 
Both equations (18) and (21) for N=1, give the same result 
i.e. ( ) ( ) 11,11,1 == PCNFCN pp  which is an obvious result 
because in this case there is no remaining coalition  
IV. OPTIMIZATION OF THE CLUSTER SIZE 
The size of the cluster N is the parameter to be optimized. 
This optimization is performed through maximization of the 
throughput received by the cluster head. Using (3) and (4) 
and definition of the coalition formation process, for the 
network with M links, available rate for a singleton with 
index 0 is 
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If we assume that the same rate cR , is dedicated for 
communication between the cluster head with each coalition 
candidate and that the spectra share is the same for any 
member of the coalition, the rate per member is 
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where y is SNR of useful signal (signal of coalition head) and 
iy  is SNR of ith interfering signal. At the beginning, 
cS
 is 
unknown and therefore the interference term ∑
∉ cSi
iy  is 
estimated as follows, 
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Since interference coming from the member of coalition 
cluster is greater than useful signal term ∑
∈ cSi
iy  can be 
estimated as, 
 Fig.1. Graph presentation of CFP. 
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where P(.) is probability distribution function for iy s which 
is dependent on the propagation environment and distribution 
of nodes. For getting rid of P(y), we approximate right hand 
side of (27) as 
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From (25), (26), and (29) the rate per member as a function of 
N is expressed as 
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Equation (30) shows that by increasing the N, not only the 
number of interferers decreases, but also the average of 
received interference from each interferer decreases and this 
is the direct result of selection of the candidates with stronger 
interference. 
Extension to the fair distribution of the game value, 
proportional to the contribution to the gain is straightforward. 
The optimum N is calculated through the maximization of 
sum throughput. For illustration purposes as an example 
assume that cR  is proportional to the available data rate as 
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Then NR  is derived as 
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where y is the average signal to noise ratio in cS . In this case 
optimum N is the closest integer to the solution of the 
following equation / 0NR N∂ ∂ =  resulting into 
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In the case where cR  is constant optimum, N is the closest 
integer to the solution to the following equation 
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Fig. 2. Modelling of the a) arrivals of a new link b) departure of a 
link during the coalition formation process. 
 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this Section, we present numerical results for the proposed 
model. All nodes are assumed uniformly distributed on a 
rectangular and results are averaged over 20000 independent 
runs. Figs. 3-4 presents throughput and average optimum 
cluster size w.r.t. SNR for both fix and proportional cR  and 
compare throughput achieved by them with no coalition case 
i.e. when N=1. It is clear that comparing the results of fix and 
proportional cR  does not make sense but this Fig. is 
presented to compare them with no coalition case.  
Fig. 3 presents optimum cluster size for M=10 and 25. For 
low SNR values when the performance is rather dependent to 
SNR than interference, coalition does not much improve the 
performance and therefore optimum cluster size is small. On 
the other hand, for large values of cR  and α , optimum 
cluster size is small because larger cluster sizes need more 
dedicated bandwidth for coalition negotiation. Fig. 4 
confirms this result and we can see for large values of cR  
and α  coalition does not much improve the throughput. In a 
practical network, when nodes are stationary the coalition 
negotiation is performed only once and when we have a 
dynamic network, further negotiations are necessary upon 
mobility in the networks and actually the average required 
cR  is low. From Fig. 3, we can see, for very small values of 
cR  and α the average optimum cluster size is almost M/2.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we model the self organized distributed 
coalition games for spectrum sharing. The proposed model is 
efficient for large scale ad hoc network especially in dynamic 
environments when the number of active links is varying. 
Then using the proposed model, mean and variance of the 
required time for the coalition process are analytically 
derived in closed form. Throughput as a function of cluster 
size is analytically derived and the cluster size is optimized to 
achieve the maximize throughput. Simulation results prove 
the throughput gain compared to no coalition case.  
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Fig. 3. Optimum cluster size w.r.t. SNR. 
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